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17 July 2009 Jakarta Bombing: 
The aftermath and longer-term 
implications by Tan Sri Dr Munir Majid
Although the carnage in Indonesia was not as great or as bloody as in 2002, 2003 or 2005, the political 
lessons to be learned in the immediate aftermath of the 
July 17 2009 bombing are not to be neglected. There are 
also various implications of the outrage on Indonesia’s 
self-confidence which bear reflection as the world’s most 
populous Muslim nation and Southeast Asia’s largest 
economy moves towards playing a regional role with 
global reach, which was how President Susilo Bambang 
Yodhoyono (SBY) had described it in a lecture at the 
LSE on 31 March 2009.
Bitter after-taste of the presidential election 
campaign
When the bombs went off, it had been a long four years 
since such an outrage, a period which largely coincided with 
SBY’s first term in office. Coming as it did nine days after his 
victory in the first ever democratic re-election of an Indonesian 
president, the bombing obviously marred a propitious event 
whose clear outcome was already being challenged by the 
defeated parties. Thus it was perhaps not too surprising that 
a ruthless act of terror became enmeshed in formal domestic 
politics. Anger at the turn of events was translated into 
a presidential public reaction that was seen and heard as 
near-accusation and attack on the Megawati-Prabowo team, 
which was the most adamant on challenging the outcome 
of the presidential election, a position restated when the 
official result was declared on July 24. Megawati rejected 
the outcome, citing various electoral irregularities. The other 
contestant Jusuf Kalla mildly indicated he would challenge 
the result in the constitutional court which was rather odd 
as his Golkar party had said it would support the president 
in parliament and government. Thus, while the country was 
spared a second round of the presidential election – something 
not desired by many businessmen and professionals given it 
had followed an already long parliamentary election campaign 
- the bitterness of the contest continued to live on with the 
allegation of electoral fraud which, in turn, found a reaction 
in SBY’s immediate statement that the bombing could have 
been the work of his political rivals.
In the face-to-face TV debates of the campaign, there was 
a civility which belied the no-holds-barred contest on the 
ground. The more restrained SBY was at the receiving end 
of some vicious tactics, including the use of pictures of the 
president for shooting target practice. There was an inner 
venom obscured by the outward calm seen from afar. With 
continued challenge of the outcome of the election, even 
after he had been so overwhelmingly re-elected, SBY went on 
the offensive after an event which threatened to undermine 
what he hoped to achieve for the future of the country even 
as his political rivals sought to deny him that chance.
Of course, investigations by police of his own administration 
have established the bombing was the work of Islamist 
terrorists thought to be linked to a splinter group of Jemaah 
Islamiah, a well-known group with previous links to al Qaeda. 
But, just as Megawati and, to an extent Kalla, were not 
giving any quarter despite the challenge the bombing posed 
particularly to the Indonesian economy, SBY was not letting 
them off the hook by associating their actions with those of 
the bombers. In other words, if they did not care that the 
bombing was designed to harm foreign investment (the 
bombing at the Marriott was aimed at a regular meeting of 
the top 50 foreign investors in the country) and domestic 
tourism, then they were as bad as the merchants of terror.
The upshot is it’s politics as usual. SBY’s  re-election, with 
61 per cent of the votes, has not cleared the way for him 
to govern with a clear mandate without challenge to his 
legitimacy. It is no big deal and it is not likely the challenge 
will be sustained, but his rivals are intent on putting a 
question mark against him even as he seeks to move on 
to address Indonesia’s many problems of political stability, 
corruption, infrastructure-building, distribution of income and 
economic growth . There was no rallying around him and the 
government when the bombs went off, and there is not likely 
to be full-throated support as he tries to get at the root of the 
terror networks which may pit him against  Muhammadiyah, 
the second largest Muslim group in the country.
On the contrary, he has come under attack, most notably 
in the English language Jakarta Post, which had supported 
Jusuf Kalla in the presidential campaign, for associating 
Prabowo – Megawati’s running mate – with the bombing. 
Some other Indonesian commentators, however, expressed 
the view that on the day he made that veiled allegation, 
on July 17, he became the true politician which he hitherto 
had not been – putting his opponents on the run, having 
to deny any involvement with the bombing. But, if he had 
intended that by being put on the defensive, they would 
not challenge the outcome of the presidential election, SBY 
was to be disappointed. Not only are they carrying on with 
the challenge, they have counter-attacked him vigorously for 
daring to suggest they were involved in the bombing in any 
way. As in any democracy, terror bombing or not, politics will 
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hold sway and the process in this populous nation will be as 
complex and complicated as ever, despite the overwhelming 
vote for the president. So, if the president became truly a 
politician on July 17, he will have to continue to be one, with 
perhaps better political management at a time of national 
challenge by rallying support for the government against 
the terrorists.
Manchester United in the Mix
The touring Manchester United football team were in Malaysia 
when the bombs exploded in the Marriott and the Ritz Carlton, 
where they were due to stay, before playing against an 
Indonesian All-Stars side on Monday July 20. Not surprisingly, 
Manchester United announced they were scrapping the 
Jakarta visit and staying an extra two days in Kuala Lumpur, 
with an additional match against a Malaysian eleven on 
the day they would have played in Jakarta. The Indonesian 
presidential spokesperson, however, issued a statement on 
July 18 calling on United to continue with the match in Jakarta 
“as a measure of solidarity”. This crossed-line was quickly 
captured by CNN that Saturday as “Manchester United Snub 
Indonesia.” With passions surrounding the bombing running 
high, they were to go up another notch in the football-crazy 
nation. Although the fans vented their anger at the terrorists, 
which was a good thing, at the governmental level there was 
disappointment with United.
Not being particularly well-schooled in international diplomacy 
– which hopefully after this incident they will be – United 
thought it was quite reasonable they should call off the 
Indonesian leg of their Asian tour after what happened in 
Jakarta at the hotel their players and officials were due to 
stay. However, just a public announcement to this effect 
without any show of solidarity by letting the Indonesian 
government know first, was not seen to be particularly 
good form. A belated third-party attempt on the Sunday to 
put right this unintended “snub”, as CNN had put it, with 
Sir Bobby Charlton and United CEO David Gill ready to fly 
over to Jakarta to call on the president and to set the record 
straight, could not take place as the Indonesians felt “the 
moment had passed”.
This little incident illustrates how prickly the Indonesians and 
their government can be and how counter-parties should 
be sensitive in dealing with them, what more at a time 
of distress like the July 17 Jakarta bombing. Just to make 
United feel better Malaysia, supposedly close to Indonesia, 
has many a time been caught in the vortex of Indonesian 
emotion. During the presidential election campaign, the 
long-simmering issue of the treatment of Indonesian maids 
in Malaysian households broke out again, and Indonesia 
temporarily suspended the flow of maids across the Java 
Sea and the Malacca Straits. During the campaign too, the 
disputed territorial sea boundary between the two countries 
in Ambalat became the subject of claimed violations by the 
Malaysian navy. As did the emotionally-charged alleged ill-
treatment of an Indonesian beauty queen by her Malaysian 
Prince husband from whom she escaped, which was a news 
item taken up by the Indonesian media with gusto. Indeed 
Indonesian television subsequently aired old footage from 
the Sukarno days with the rallying cry Ganyang, or destroy, 
Malaysia which the fiery first Indonesian president in the 
sixties called a neo-colonialist project.
Actually, although relations between Indonesia and 
Malaysia have a peculiar ambivalence at the popular level, 
as between two blood brothers which is how the two 
nations often describe themselves, relations at the official 
level are excellent. The volatility however, even if more 
pronounced in the relationship with Malaysia, reflects a 
cry for an entitlement in the region not always accorded it. 
As shown when there were tragic military aircraft crashes, 
also during the course of the long presidential campaign, 
there is also an internalized conflict in the Indonesian mind 
when events inside the country make it fall short of that 
perceived position of entitlement. In respect of the July 
17 bombing, Indonesia will also feel aggrieved that it 
should be hit again by these acts of terror. It is important 
to give it at least moral support, as was done by ASEAN 
foreign ministers in the same weekend after the bombing, 
or as was expressed US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
who was in Phuket for the ASEAN Regional Forum in the 
week that followed. However, in the actual cooperative 
effort by all countries in the region and beyond, there 
should be no question of Indonesian commitment and 
capability in the fight against terror, and there should be 
understanding there could be frustration in the Indonesian 
mind that it should happen to them, and that too most 
likely orchestrated by a Malaysian-born terrorist Noordin 
Mohammad Top who appears to have master-minded the 
bombing and trained the terrorists to make the bombs. 
Any statement, as was made by a Malaysian minister in the 
week following July 17 that there was actually no evidence 
Noordin was involved was quite unnecessary. How would 
he know, when he was not involved in the investigation 
in Indonesia, the government there could legitimately ask 
– and then there could be another little grudge.
Regional Role, Global Reach?
There have been commentaries on whether the July 17 
bombing would slow down Indonesia’s progress towards 
becoming the pre-eminent Southeast Asian regional power. 
Actually, this is no time to ask that question, as the threat 
of terror is transnational and the July 17 installment is part 
of an extremist commitment to establish a caliphate based 
on shariah law extending from southern Philippines, cutting 
into southern Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, with the 
Indonesian archipelago at the core. As an American official 
said to me, the US administration has no doubt about 
official Indonesian commitment to combat extreme Islamist 
terror, but in a country so vast and populous there will be 
the pockets of sympathizers ready to be canon fodder in 
a larger struggle. While the intelligence services of the 
region no doubt cooperate and exchange information, 
it would be a good move if Indonesia were to take the 
lead in giving public and political expression once again 
to regional determination to root out the groups that 
carry out these acts of terror. The most obvious occasion 
would be the ASEAN summit in October.
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Nevertheless, the bombing was a setback to the country 
when everything appeared to be going so well in terms of its 
political stability, economic development and regional stature. 
As noted, the July 8 presidential election saw the first-time 
democratic re-election of an Indonesian president, even if 
the defeated rivals are not accepting the result. President 
SBY’s overwhelming margin of victory itself should be able 
to ride over the objections, although it would not be as plain 
sailing for him as he would have hoped given the margin of 
his victory. There will be the sense of a victory marred. But 
SBY will have to get over it and manage the politics, even if 
his predisposition is to get on with government.
Similarly, the economy was largely going well against the 
back-drop of hitherto successful neighbours struggling in the 
global crisis. At a growth rate of about 4 per cent this year, 
and with the economic resilience the country has exhibited, 
there is an expectation of Indonesia being one of the top 
ten economies in the world by 2050. Indeed, even now, 
it is being asked if Indonesia is not the missing “brick” in 
Goldman Sach’s BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
President SBY is itching to get the economy really going 
as he assembles his Cabinet. Of course he does not need 
the July 17 bombing or the challenge to his re-election, but 
what he has to demonstrate is an ability to ride over these 
challenges while keeping Indonesia steady and stable. He has 
to show on his watch comments that Indonesia’s progress 
is uncertain because of the tendency for the country to 
go off the rails, as has happened in the past, are without 
basis. He had a reasonable first five years. Not only are the 
next five important, but also what happens beyond 2014. 
A stable system of governance, policies and succession has 
to be established.
The trappings of regional power status are already there. 
What Indonesia has to do is to fit into the role, which includes 
not flying off the handle, and an ability to deal with crises. 
The Americans have clearly indicated their assessment that 
Indonesia, as the world’s most populous Muslim nation and 
its third largest democracy, is a fine example of progress, 
stability and moderation. The US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton’s visit to Jakarta in February underlined this, and all 
the indications are President Barack Obama will still make an 
official visit to Indonesia after the Singapore APEC summit in 
November. The July 17 bombing has not changed this and the 
US president will be reliving part of his childhood in Jakarta.
America’s interest in seeing an Indonesia which pulls its 
weight as a regional power is of course not entirely benign. 
There are balance of power considerations against a rising 
China by having a rising Indonesia, in much the same way 
India is being cultivated and Japan is already on side. Of 
course, as with India, many Indonesians will scoff at this. 
The tradition of having an independent foreign policy and 
of not being associated with one side or another, called 
non-alignment in the Cold War years, is well-established. 
Any appearance of falling into the American camp will be 
strongly resisted, as was shown in some of the arguments 
during the presidential campaign. However, just as India 
has interests which are not congruent with China’s, so too 
Indonesia. The question now is how Indonesia conducts its 
foreign policy which, while not being always in agreement 
with China, is not seen to be wholly allied with the US. There 
is great need for foreign investment but that is not in the 
future expected to overwhelmingly come from the West 
or the US. China is now the net exporter of capital. How 
much and how far can Indonesia receive all this capital 
from the US or China without generating resentment of 
the kind demonstrated against the Japanese in the 1970s? 
There are many balancing acts to be made which will 
only increase as Indonesia’s power and interests expand. 
It would be rather petulant and short-sighted of Indonesia, 
for instance, to question the worth of membership of 
ASEAN, at precisely the time its increasing stature came 
to be recognized. All the shortcomings of the regional 
organization – for example, its slow pace of integration, 
its inability to project a common position on many issues, 
the reluctance to take a clear stand against Myanmar and 
on human rights - are best addressed if Indonesia took 
the calculated risk of providing robust leadership on those 
issues. That would be a measure of regional stature, rather 
than going-it-alone as a first option.
There are many great issues facing the region and the 
world. Of course, all too evidently, international terrorism 
is one, but there are the other big issues of the new world 
economic and financial order, of climate change and the 
many territorial disputes still outstanding in the region, 
where Indonesian leadership would be an exercise in 
regional power. On the attainment of a new world and 
financial order for example, Indonesian membership of 
the G20 and ASEAN’s attendance could be mutually 
reinforcing. However, what one hears from some ASEAN 
foreign ministries is that any engagement with the 
Indonesians on what positions they would be taking may 
be construed as “interference in their internal affairs”. 
Indonesia should begin to gather together all the various 
strands of the membership and of views, and make the 
regional organization make decisions and not duck them.
Conclusion 
Indonesia is at a turning point which the July 17 bombing 
highlighted but did not cause. Its domestic politics will be 
as complex as ever even as the newly re-elected president 
and government address the many challenges that face the 
country which could do with less and not more politics. 
That, however, is the price of democracy.
The country’s rise in stature as a regional power has not 
been blocked, but the intricacies of regional power status 
are becoming increasingly evident which require balanced 
consideration and responsible decision-making. A rush 
to the head of the new-found status could be damaging 
both to Indonesia and the region.
In president SBY Indonesia, and the region, have the 
best leader available to handle the domestic, regional 
and global challenges. He should not, however, allow his 
generally intelligent, rational and responsible leadership 
to be tipped over by challenges which seek to make him 
lose his balance, and by expectations which race too far 
ahead of Indonesia’s position as a regional power.
